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"The regulation proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision should not be assessed
in isolation (...) The changes in the nancial system caused by the regulation will have to be factored
in also by the policy authorities. For central banks, the changes may be far-reaching, ranging from
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to interactions with several aspects of the operational
frameworks." Speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European
Central Bank, at the International Banking Conference Matching Stability and Performance: the
Impact of New Regulations on Financial Intermediary Management, Milan, 29 September 2010.
1 Introduction
The recent crisis has taught us that a necessary condition for growth, technological advances, and
innovation is to have a stable economic and nancial environment. In order to promote economic
recovery and stabilize the nancial sector, some changes to nancial regulation have been proposed. In
this context, a very important package of regulations is the so-called Basel III. Basel III is a comprehensive
set of reform measures in banking regulation, supervision and risk management. It was developed by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
to strengthen the banking sector and achieve nancial stability. Furthermore, some of the new measures
that Basel III introduces are aimed at preventing future crises, creating a sound nancial system in which
nancial problems are not spread to the real economy. Preventive measures acting in this direction are
known between researchers and policy-makers as macroprudential policies.
However, these changes to nancial regulation have to coexist with monetary policy; therefore, the
interaction of the policies conducted by central banks with the set of new regulations is a relevant topic
of study. In particular, the transmission and the optimal monetary policy may change depending on the
regulations that are in place.
The BCBS aims at providing some guidance for banking regulators on what the best practice for
banks is. Its standards are accepted worldwide and are generally incorporated in national banking
regulations. The subsequent Basel regulations proposed by the BCBS1 have introduced, among other
elements, higher compulsory capital requirement ratios (CRR) for banks. Basel I and II required a
minimum total CRR of 8%.2 Afterwards, Basel III introduced a mandatory capital conservation bu¤er
1Basel I, signed in 1988; Basel II, published in 2004; and Basel III, agreed in 2010.
2We are aware that Pilar I of Basel II signicantly increases the risk sensitivity of the capital rule, with respect to Basel
I, and considers di¤erent approaches to compute the minimum CRR. However, for the goal of this paper, we only take into
account the quantitative level of the CRR, not the qualitative implications.
2
of 2.5% designed to enforce corrective action when a banks capital ratio deteriorates. Then, although
the minimum total capital requirement remains at the current 8% level, yet the required total capital
increases up to 10.5% when combined with the conservation bu¤er. Furthermore, Basel III adds a
dynamic macroprudential element in the form of a countercyclical capital bu¤er up to another 2.5% of
capital, which requires banks to hold more capital in good times to prepare for downturns in the economy.
In this way, Basel III tries to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector
from periods of excessive credit growth.3 Therefore, the macroprudential approach of Basel III has two
components: on the one hand, it increases the static CRR permanently and, on the other hand, it adds
a dynamic macroprudential bu¤er which will depend on economic conditions.
However, the way to implement this dynamic macroprudential component of Basel III has not been
fully specied by the Committee.4 The BCBS states the objectives of this additional countercyclical
bu¤er (CB): "The primary aim of the countercyclical capital bu¤er regime is to use a bu¤er of capital
to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess
aggregate credit growth that have often been associated with the build-up of system-wide risk" (BCBS,
2010).5 Nevertheless, it leaves its implementation as an open question, encouraging authorities to apply
judgment in the setting of the bu¤er using the best information available.
The BCBS also claims that the CB is not meant to be used as an instrument to manage economic
cycles or asset prices; these are issues that should be addressed by other policies such as monetary policy.
Then, the interaction of the Basel regulation with monetary policy is of an extreme relevance.
Therefore, it is very timely to do research on this topic to provide some general guidance to cor-
rectly implement this regulation, together with monetary policy. It is also crucial to consider both
macroprudential aspects of Basel III, the increase in the static CRR and the countercyclical bu¤er since,
depending on the country, the countercyclical bu¤er could be more di¢ cult to implement. For instance,
in developing or low-income countries, the bu¤er could be problematic due to lack of data availability.
Capacity constraints and enforcement di¢ culties may make time-varying macroprudential rules more
complicated to be implemented. In those countries, the most relevant aspect of the Basel regulation
would be the static CRR. In our paper, unlike the rest of the literature on macroprudential policies, we
3The reform package is a major overhaul of Basel I and II. Basel III includes a comprehensive set of rules encompassing
tighter denitions of capital, a framework for capital conservation and countercyclical bu¤ers, improved risk capture, a non-
risk-based leverage ratio, and a novel regime for liquidity risk. In this paper, we are interested in the capital requirement
ratio and the countercyclical bu¤er as a macroprudential tool.
4The BCBS proposes a common reference guidethat should form the starting point of the discussion.
5Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010). Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital
bu¤er, BIS document.
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provide an extensive analysis not only to the time-varying CRR but also to the static ones, to see how
they a¤ect the economy and the optimal conduct of monetary policy.
Thus, the goal of this paper is to study the e¤ects of the Basel I, II and III regulations on CRR
as well as its interactions with monetary policy. We would like to provide some general lines to cor-
rectly implement this regulation, together with monetary policy. We aim at disentangling the e¤ects of
increasing CRR as well as the e¤ects of introducing a dynamic macroprudential countercyclical bu¤er
on the economy. Ultimately, our objective is to design an optimal policy mix that includes monetary
parameters, the CRR, and the macroprudential CB to best achieve the goals of economic and nancial
stability.
In order to do that, we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which features
a housing market. The modelling framework consists of an economy composed by banks, borrowers
and savers. Banks act as nancial intermediaries between both types of consumers. This microfounded
general equilibrium model allows us to explore all the interrelations that appear between the real economy
and the credit market.
In this setting, there are three types of distortions: price rigidities, credit frictions and loan frictions.
The rst distortion appears because of the presence of sticky prices and monopolistic competition, typical
in new Keynesian models in which monetary policy has real e¤ects on the economy. Savers, the owners
of the rms, may prefer policies that reduce this price stickiness distortion. Second, credit frictions are
present because borrowers need collateral to take credit. Borrowers may prefer a scenario in which the
pervasive e¤ect of the collateral constraint is softened. They operate in a second-best situation. They
consume according to the borrowing constraint as opposed to savers that follow an Euler equation for
consumption. Borrowers cannot smooth consumption by themselves, but a more stable nancial system
would provide them a setting in which their consumption pattern is smoother.6 Third, loan frictions are
found because banks, by Basel regulation, must have a CRR; they are constrained in the amount they
can loan. Banks may prefer policies that ease their capital constraint, since capital requirement ratios
distort their ability to generate prots and thus to consume.7
Furthermore, there are two policy authorities: the central bank and the macroprudential regulator.
The central bank aims at minimizing the variability of output and ination to reduce the distortion
6 In other words, if the nancial system is very unstable and the asset prices (house prices in this framework) are very
volatile, borrowersconsumption will be also very volatile since it depends on the value of the collateral.
7 In this model, an increase in the capital requirement ratio implies a lower leverage ratio, since higher CRR diminishes
the percentage of deposits that banks can convert into loans and, therefore, reduces the capacity of banks of making prots.
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introduced by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition, using the interest rate as an instrument.
The macroprudential authority can use the CB proposed by Basel III, with the CRR as an instrument,
to achieve a more stable nancial system. However, we will show that some trade-o¤s between agents
may appear because of the di¤erent e¤ects of each policy on rigidities.
Using this framework, we address several key research questions. First, we analyze how the di¤erent
values of the CRR, including those of Basel I, II and III, a¤ect the di¤erent agents and the whole society,
for given monetary policy. We nd that increasing the CRR has positive second-order e¤ect for borrowers
but negative for savers and banks. However, given that CRR regulations are not microfounded here, we
adopt a positive approach along the paper. Second-order values should not be taken as normative. That
is, we take the presence of the macroprudential regulator as given and study the e¤ects of the regulation
on the economy and its interaction with monetary policy.
Second, we then examine the interaction between monetary policy and the Basel regulation. In this
spirit, we consider how the optimal monetary policy changes with di¤erent values of the CRR. We observe
that the higher the CRR, the more aggressive monetary policy needs to be in order to compensate for
a lower money multiplier.
Third, we nd an optimal implementation of the CB, the instrument that Basel III provides to
the macroprudential authority, which delivers a more stable nancial system, acting together with a
monetary authority that cares of macroeconomic stability. We suggest that the CB follows a rule that
increases capital requirements when credit deviates from its steady state and lowers it when the situation
is the opposite.8 Once we have established the rule, we look for its optimal reaction parameters, together
with those of monetary policy.9 Results show that the monetary and the macroprudential authorities
acting together can deliver higher macroeconomic and nancial stability. We calculate consumption
equivalent changes derived from a second-order approximation of the model. We nd that, although
there may be winners and losers when applying the macroprudential policy, there exists a system of
transfers à la Kaldor-Hicks which can be implemented to obtain a Pareto-superior outcome to overcome
this trade-o¤.
In terms of dynamics, our paper shows that Basel regulations also a¤ect the transmission of mone-
tary policy. In particular, using the optimal parameters, we nd that the higher capital requirements
8This follows Janet Yellens advice: Financial institutions may be required to build capital bu¤ers in good times,
which they can run down in bad times, thereby limiting credit growth during booms and mitigating credit contraction in
downturns." Yellen (2010).
9Drehmann et al. (2010) points out that the deviations of credit from its long-term trend are very good indicators of
the increase in systemic risk.
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introduced by Basel III mitigate expansionary monetary policy shocks. And so does the optimal imple-
mentation of the CB, since the CRR goes up to avoid credit increases.10 We also explore the e¤ects of
a negative shock to bank capital. We nd that, under Basel III with the CB, the CRR would decrease
to compensate for the loss in capital, palliating the negative e¤ects of the shock.
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 1.1 makes a review of the related literature.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the implications of the new regulation on the di¤erent
agents, for given monetary policy. Section 4 explains the interaction between the CRR and monetary
policy. Section 5 studies the optimal way to implement the CB, together with monetary policy. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Our approach ts into the ourishing literature interested in analyzing macroprudential policies that
deliver a more stable nancial system, on the limelight after the crisis. The experience with this kind
of policies is still scarce. However, although there is consensus about the need of these policies, the
e¤ects of them are still not absolutely understood. Thus, given the novelty of this perspective and the
uncertainty about its e¤ects, the studies on the topic are also quite recent.
The analysis that we carry out, though, focuses on quantifying the e¤ects of macroprudential policies
in a very specic context: the Basel III regulation. We provide some guidance to optimally implement
this new set of banking regulation for a wide range of countries. Therefore, unlike other papers in
the macroprudential literature, we contribute nding results both for the macroprudential e¤ects of the
permanent increase in the CRR of Basel III as well as for the dynamic counter-cyclical bu¤er that it
introduces.11
Borio (2003) was one of the pioneers on the subject. He distinguishes between microprudential
regulation, which seeks to enhance the safety and soundness of individual nancial institutions, as
opposed to the macroprudential view, which focuses on welfare of the nancial system as a whole.
Following this work, Acharya (2009) points out the necessity of regulatory mechanisms that mitigate
aggregate risk, in order to avoid future crises. The literature has proposed several instruments to be
10Any change in the CRR will have an e¤ect on supplied lending. This is due to the fact that the model does not consider
di¤erent types of capital nor assets; and the constraints are always binding (borrowers are borrowing as much as they can
and banks hold capital requirement at the minimum regulatory levels). Therefore, the increase in the CRR will always
increase the capital and reduce lending.
11As stated in the introduction, the static CRR may be the focus of macroprudential policies in developing and low-income
countries because of their possible capacity constraints and enforcement di¢ culties.
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implemented as a macroprudential tool. A complete description of them appears in Bank of England
(2009) and (2011). We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroprudential tool of Basel
III, namely the countercyclical bu¤er and studying its e¤ects for both the nancial system and the
macroeconomy, decomposing the channels between di¤erent agents.12
A key aspect of Basel III regulation is focused on limits on capital requirements. One of the lines of
study of the literature about Basel measures focuses on the welfare e¤ects of the new banking rules. There
is some controversy around this regulation that has been pointed out by the literature. In particular,
some concerns have been raised about the impact of Basel III reforms on the dynamism of nancial
markets and, in turn, on investment and economic growth. A number of studies have found that
increasing capital requirements may reduce credit supply (Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Gambacorta and
Mistrulli, 2004). The reasoning is that Basel III regulation could produce a decline in the amount of
credit and impact negatively in the whole economy. Critics of Basel III consider that there is a real
danger that reform will limit the availability of credit and reduce economic activity. We contribute to
the discussion by seeing the e¤ects of Basel III under a negative bank capital shock. We nd that the
countercyclical bu¤er would help mitigate the negative e¤ects of the shock. Our results also show that
the countercyclical bu¤er increases both macroeconomic and nancial stability.
On the other hand, Tchana Tchana (2013) introduces the new banking regulation in an overlapping-
generations model and nds that the overall e¤ect of optimal regulation on social welfare is positive when
productivity shocks are su¢ ciently high and economic agents are su¢ ciently risk-averse. Repullo and
Saurina (2013) model the business cycle as a Markov process with two states (expansion and recession),
and consider that for su¢ ciently large values of the social cost of bank failure, the reforms introduced
by Basel III are in the right direction. Although we take a positive approach, we contribute to this line
of study with a second order analysis of di¤erent CRR for a given monetary policy. We nd that with
higher CRR there are some distributional e¤ects in favour of borrowers and against savers and banks.
Other academics have focused their e¤orts in analyzing the countercyclical bu¤er of Basel III. For
instance, Drehmann and Gambacorta (2011) study the CB and show a simulation that indicates that the
CB scheme might reduce credit growth during credit booms and decrease the credit contraction once the
12Some recent papers have examined Basel III liquidity risk measures, including liquidity coverage ratio and net stable
funding ratio. For instance, the empirical approach of Hong, Huang, and Wu (2014), based on the theoretical model of
Allen et al. (2009), di¤erentiate between idiosyncratic and systemic liquidity risks. Since the new liquidity ratios of Basel
III target an individual banks liquidity risk management, their e¤ects are largely contained in the idiosyncratic channel. By
comparing the contributions of idiosyncratic and systemic liquidity risks, they assess the e¤ectiveness of the new liquidity
risk standards in reducing bank failures. However, these measures are out of the scope of our paper. Our model is a stilized
macro model in which assets and liabilities are homogenous and this distinction cannot be made.
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bu¤er is released. This would help to achieve higher banking sector resilience to shocks. Nevertheless,
their procedure is subject to the Lucass critique: had the scheme been in place, bankslending decisions
would probably have been di¤erent. Our approach is robust to this critique because it is based on a
DSGE model, and, therefore, contributes signicantly to support the idea that if the regulator increases
CRR, the credit supply would decrease.
There are a number of papers on the optimality of capital adequacy requirements (see, e.g., Hellmann
et al., 2000, Allen and Gale, 2003, Allen and Gale, 2004). Gerali et al. (2010), induce the existence
of bu¤ers by postulating that the deviation from some ad hoc target capital ratio involves a quadratic
cost forcing the building up of bu¤ers when cyclically sensitive variables, such as bank prots and
credit growth, are high (see Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS, 2009; and BCBS,
2010). Repullo and Suarez (2013), which study optimal bank capital regulation over the cycle and
compare it to regulations that resemble Basel I, II, and III, nd that counter-cyclical bu¤ers help to
mitigate the procyclical e¤ects of regulations such as Basel II. Repullo and Saurina (2012) critique
the design of the countercyclical bu¤er of Basel III because, when GDP growth is low, it may end
up exacerbating the inherent procyclicality of risk-sensitive bank capital regulation. Adding to the
discussion, we propose a Taylor-type rule responding to credit deviations from the steady state for the
CB, which is countercyclical.
Using the proposed Taylor-type rule for the CB, we contribute to this line of research analyzing the
changes in consumption equivalents for several agents in the economy and stating for which of them the
Basel regulation could imply a positive or negative change. We nd that capital requirements have a
negative e¤ect for banks while positive for borrowers. We also nd that, even the regulation by itself
is not positive for savers, it can be when the macroprudential and monetary policies interact in an
optimal way. Using another approach, Angeloni and Faia (2013) consider that the best combination
of policy rules for welfare includes mildly anticyclical capital ratios (as in Basel III) and a response of
monetary policy to asset prices or bank leverage. We contribute by explicitly calculating, in a general
equilibrium model, the optimal parameters of monetary policy, with a standard Taylor rule, and the
macroprudential CB based on credit deviation from its steady state, and the e¤ects on the three types of
agents (borrowers, savers and banks). Our approach is di¤erent in the sense that we take the regulation
for granted.
Our paper is connected as well with the literature that uses a DSGE model to study the e¤ects
of a macroprudential rule acting together with monetary policy. For instance, Borio and Shim (2007)
8
emphasize the complementary role of macroprudential policy to monetary policy and its supportive
role as a built-in stabilizer. Also, N.Diaye (2009) shows that monetary policy can be supported by
countercyclical prudential regulation and that it can help the monetary authorities to achieve their
output and ination targets with smaller changes in interest rates. In addition, Antipa et al. (2010)
use a DSGE model to show that macroprudential policies would have been e¤ective in smoothing the
past credit cycle and in reducing the intensity of the recession. In our paper, we contribute to this
topic. We clearly nd that higher capital requirements interfere with monetary policy goals. Higher
capital requirements imply a lower money multiplier; monetary policy needs to be more aggressive to
compensate for that and obtain similar macroeconomic volatilities. Furthermore, the nancial system is
more stable.
Additionally, our model is part of a new generation of models that attempt to incorporate banks in
the analysis. The arrival of the nancial crisis led to realize that the mainstream dynamic model, even
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), does not include specic banks and no specic role for bank
capital. New models include Gertler and Karadi (2009), Meh and Moran (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), or Iacoviello (2015). Their strategy, and ours, can be summarized as consistent on adding a second
layer of nancially constrained agents which are the banks. Similarly to our case, Angelini et al. (2014)
uses a DSGE model with a banking sector à la Gerali et al. (2010). They show interactions between the
capital requirement ratio that responds to output growth (while we model countercyclical capital bu¤ers
in line with the current regulatory framework responding to credit), and monetary policy. They nd that
no regime, cooperative or non-cooperative between macroprudential and monetary authorities, makes
all agents, borrowers or savers, better o¤. Our results show that this is the case for banks. However, we
could nd a system of transfers à la Kaldor-Hicks that generates a Pareto-superior outcome.
2 Model Setup
The modelling framework is a DSGE model with a housing market, following Iacoviello (2015). The
economy features patient and impatient households, bankers and a nal goods rm. Households work
and consume both consumption goods and housing. Patient and impatient households are savers and
borrowers, respectively. Financial intermediaries intermediate funds between consumers. Bankers are
credit constrained in how much they can borrow from savers, and borrowers are credit constrained
with respect to how much they can borrow from bankers. The representative rm converts household
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labor into the nal good. The central bank follows a Taylor rule for the setting of interest rates. The
countercyclical capital bu¤er of Basel III is represented by a Taylor-type rule for the setting of the capital
requirement ratio.
DSGE models are often used for policy evaluation and have become popular in the macroprudential
literature, since they count with some important advantages. First, they can be compared with a
benchmark in which there is only monetary policy and, then, obtain some insights on the introduction
of additional policies. Second, they include many sources of shocks that can be used to check for
di¤erent economic trajectories. Moreover, they rely on general equilibrium analysis and are suitable for
simulations to study the impact of new policy instruments. Also, calibrated parameters can be altered to
test for alternative policy scenarios. And nally, since DSGE models are microfounded, they are suitable
to study the second order-approximation of the utility function of each agent.13
We have employed, for the purpose of this paper, a DSGE model with housing and credit. Basel
regulations mainly refer to restrictions in credit markets. Therefore, we need to use a model that
realistically reects the behavior of credit, house prices, and the macroeconomy. Our model is based on
the basic features of Iacoviello (2005) which shows through an empirical VAR analysis that this kind
of model matches the evidence. To this basic setting, we add a banking sector, as in Iacoviello (2015),
which is crucial to discuss about the CRR regulation in the Basel accords. Thus, the proposed model
contains the necessary ingredients to face the research questions and it is supported by the empirical
evidence.
2.1 Savers
Savers maximize their utility function by choosing consumption, housing and labor hours:
maxE0
1X
t=0
ts

logCs;t + j logHs;t   (Ns;t)



;
where s 2 (0; 1) is the patient discount factor, E0 is the expectation operator and Cs;t, Hs;t and Ns;t
represent consumption at time t, the housing stock and working hours, respectively. 1= (   1) is the
labor supply elasticity,  > 0: j > 0 constitutes the relative weight of housing in the utility function.
Subject to the budget constraint:
13See Brázdik et al. (2012) for further discussion.
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Cs;t + dt + qt (Hs;t  Hs;t 1) = Rs;t 1dt 1
t
+ ws;tNs;t +
Xt   1
Xt
Yt; (1)
where dt denotes bank deposits, Rs;t is the gross return from deposits, qt is the price of housing in units
of consumption, and ws;t is the real wage rate. The last term refers to rms prots, which are rebated
back to the saver, being Xt the rms markup and Yt the output. The rst order conditions for this
optimization problem are as follows:
1
Cs;t
= sEt

Rs;t
t+1Cs;t+1

; (2)
qt
Cs;t
=
j
Hs;t
+ sEt

qt+1
Cs;t+1

; (3)
ws;t = (Ns;t)
 1Cs;t: (4)
Equation (2) is the Euler equation, the intertemporal condition for consumption. Equation (3)
represents the intertemporal condition for housing, in which, at the margin, benets for consuming
housing equate costs in terms of consumption. Equation (4) is the labor-supply condition.
2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers solve:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tb

logCb;t + j logHb;t   (Nb;t)



;
where b 2 (0; 1) is impatient discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the collateral con-
straint:
Cb;t +
Rb;tbt 1
t+1
+ qt (Hb;t  Hb;t 1) = bt + wb;tNb;t; (5)
bt  Et

1
Rb;t+1
kqt+1Hb;tt+1

; (6)
where bt denotes bank loans and Rb;t is the gross interest rate. k can be interpreted as a loan-to-
value ratio. The borrowing constraint limits borrowing to the present discounted value of their housing
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holdings. The rst order conditions are as follows:
1
Cb;t
= bEt

1
t+1Cb;t+1
Rb;t+1

+ b;t; (7)
j
Hb;t
= Et

1
Cb;t
qt   bEt

qt+1
Cb;t+1

  b;tEt

1
Rb;t+1
kqt+1t+1

; (8)
wb;t = (Nb;t)
 1Cb;t; (9)
where b;t denotes the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.14 These rst order conditions can be
interpreted analogously to the ones of savers.
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries solve the following problem:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tf [log divf;t] ;
where f 2 (0; 1) is the nancial intermediary discount factor, subject to the budget constraint and the
collateral constraint and divf;t are dividends, which we assume are fully consumed by bankers every
period, so that divf;t = Cf;t :
divf;t +
Rs;t 1dt 1
t
+ bt = dt +
Rb;tbt 1
t
; (10)
where the right-hand side measures the sources of funds for the nancial intermediary, household deposits
and repayments from borrowers on previous loans. These funds can be used to pay back depositors and
to extend new loans, or can be used for their own consumption. As in Iacoviello (2015), we assume that
the bank, by regulation, is constrained by the amount of assets minus liabilities. That is, there is a
capital requirement ratio. We dene capital as assets minus liabilities:
Capt = bt   dt: (11)
Thus, the fraction of capital with respect to assets has to be larger than a certain ratio:
14Through simple algebra it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier is positive in the steady state and thus the
collateral constraint holds with equality.
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bt   dt
bt
 CRR: (12)
Simple algebra shows that this relationship can be rewritten as:
dt  (1  CRR) bt: (13)
If we dene  = (1  CRR), we can reinterpret the capital requirement ratio condition as a standard
collateral constraint, so that banks liabilities cannot exceed a fraction of its assets, which can be used
as collateral:15
dt  bt; (14)
where  < 1. The rst order conditions for deposits and loans are as follows:
1
divf;t
= fEt

1
divf;t+1 t+1
Rs;t

+ f;t; (15)
1
divf;t
= fEt

1
divf;t+1 t+1
Rb;t+1

+ f;t; (16)
where f;t denotes the multiplier on the nancial intermediarys borrowing constraint.16
2.4 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical nal goods producers that operate under perfect competition and
exible prices. They aggregate intermediate goods according to the production function
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
" 1
" dz
 "
" 1
; (17)
where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The nal good rm chooses
Yt (z) to minimize its costs, resulting in demand of intermediate good z:
15Clerc et al. (2014) nd, using a DSGE model, that the probability of default for banks is negligible for capital
requirement ratios higher than 10%. Basel III imposes a capital requirement ratio of 10.5%, therefore, we assume that,
taking into account the goal of the paper, in our model we do not have to include default risk for banks.
16Financial intermediaries have a discount factor f < s: This condition ensures that the collateral constraint of the
intermediary holds with equality in the steady state, since f =
s f
s
0
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Yt (z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 "
Yt: (18)
The price index is then given by:
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt (z)
1 " dz
 1
" 1
: (19)
2.5 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive. Following Iacoviello (2005), intermediate
goods are produced according to the production function:
Yt (z) = AtNs;t (z)
Nb;t (z)
(1 ) ; (20)
where  2 [0; 1] measures the relative size of each group in terms of labor.17 This Cobb-Douglas
production function implies that labor e¤orts of constrained and unconstrained consumers are not perfect
substitutes. This specication is analytically tractable and allows for closed form solutions for the steady
state of the model. This assumption can be economically justied by the fact that savers are the managers
of the rms and their wage is higher than the one of the borrowers.18
At represents technology and it follows the following autoregressive process:
log (At) = A log (At 1) + uAt; (21)
where A is the autoregressive coe¢ cient and uAt is a normally distributed shock to technology. We
normalize the steady-state value of technology to 1.
Labor demand is determined by:
ws;t =
1
Xt

Yt
Ns;t
; (22)
wb;t =
1
Xt
(1  ) Yt
Nb;t
; (23)
17Notice that the absolute size of each group is one.
18 It could also be interpreted as the savers being older than the borrowers, therefore more experienced.
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where Xt is the markup, or the inverse of marginal cost.19
The price-setting problem for the intermediate good producers is a standard Calvo-Yun setting. An
intermediate good producer sells its good at price Pt (z) ; and 1  ;2 [0; 1] ; is the probability of being
able to change the sale price in every period. The optimal reset price P t (z) solves:
1X
k=0
()k Et

t;k

P t (z)
Pt+k
  "= ("  1)
Xt+k

Y t+k (z)

= 0: (24)
where "= ("  1) is the steady-state markup.
The aggregate price level is then given by:
Pt =
h
P 1 "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i1=(1 ")
: (25)
Using (24) and (25) ; and log-linearizing, we can obtain a standard forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve bt = Etbt+1  bxt+ut, that relates ination positively to future ination and negatively
to the markup (   (1  ) (1  ) =). ut is a normally distributed cost-push shock.20
2.6 Equilibrium
The total supply of housing is xed and it is normalized to unity, therefore house prices will be determined
by demand. The market clearing conditions are as follows:
Yt = Cs;t + Cb;t + Cf;t; (26)
Hs;t +Hb;t = 1: (27)
Labor supply (equations 4 and 9) and labor demand (equations 22 and 23) are equal to each other, so
that labor markets also clear. Equilibrium in nancial markets is dictated by the regulatory constraint
for banks, that is, Dt = (1  CRR) bt:
19Symmetry across rms allows us to write the demands without the index z:
20Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from the steady state.
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2.7 Monetary Policy and the Countercyclical Bu¤er
In the standard new Keynesian model, the central bank aims at minimizing the variability of output
and ination to reduce the distortion introduced by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition.
However, in models with collateral constraints, the design of optimal policies involves a number of issues
not considered in standard sticky-price models. In models with constrained individuals, there are three
types of distortions: price rigidities, credit frictions and loan frictions. This creates conicts and trade-
o¤s between borrowers, savers, and banks. Savers may prefer policies that reduce the price stickiness
distortion. However, borrowers may prefer a scenario in which the pervasive e¤ect of the collateral
constraint is softened. Borrowers operate in a second-best situation. They consume according to the
borrowing constraint as opposed to savers that follow an Euler equation for consumption. Borrowers
cannot smooth consumption by themselves, but a more stable nancial system would provide them a
setting in which their consumption pattern is smoother. In turn, banks may prefer policies that ease
their capital constraint, since capital requirement ratios distort their ability to leverage and increase
their dividends.
In the standard sticky-price model, the Taylor rule of the central bank is consistent with a loss
function that includes the variability of ination and output. In order to rationalize the objectives of
the countercyclical bu¤er in Basel III, we follow Angelini et al. (2014) in which they assume that the
loss function in the economy also contains nancial variables, namely borrowing variability, as a proxy
for nancial stability. Then, there would be a loss function for the economy that would include not only
the variability of output and ination but also the variability of borrowing: L = 2 + y
2
y + 
2
b where
2; 
2
y and 
2
b are the variances of ination, output and borrowing. y  0, represents the relative weight
of the central bank to the stabilization of output.21 The last term would represent the objective of the
countercyclical capital bu¤er in Basel III regulation (Basel IIICB).
2.7.1 Monetary Policy
For monetary policy, we consider a Taylor rule which responds to ination and output growth:
Rs;t = (Rs;t 1)

(t)
(1+R ) (Yt=Yt 1)
R
y (1=s)
1 
"Rt; (28)
21This loss function would be consistent with the studies that make a second-order approximation of the utility of
individuals and nd that it di¤ers from the standard case by including nancial variables.
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where 0    1 is the parameter associated with interest-rate inertia, R  0 and Ry  0 measure the
response of interest rates to current ination and output growth, respectively. "Rt is a white noise shock
with zero mean and variance 2" .
2.7.2 A rule for the Countercyclical Capital Bu¤er
Here, following the Basel III guidelines, for the countercyclical bu¤er, we propose a Taylor-type rule that
includes deviations of credit from its steady state, in order to explicitly promote stability and reduce
systemic risk. This rule is analogous to the rule for monetary policy, but using the CRR as an instrument.
It implies that the capital requirement ratio uctuates around a steady state value, corresponding to the
Basel III requirement for capital (10.5%), and it increases when credit grows above its steady state. The
implementation of this rule would include the capital bu¤er stated in Basel IIICB. Then, the optimal
implementation of Basel IIICB would be the value of the reaction parameter that minimizes second-order
losses:
CRRt = (CRRSS)

bt
b
b
(29)
This rule states that, whenever regulators observe that credit deviates is above its steady-state value,
they automatically increase the capital requirement ratio to avoid an excess in credit.
2.8 Second-order approximation
Even though the paper takes a positive approach, we numerically evaluate the second-order e¤ects
implied by the regulations for the di¤erent agents of the model. Thus, we solve the model using a
second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating the utility
associated to each individual. As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), we take this latter approach to be
able to evaluate the e¤ects for the three types of agents separately.22 The individual second order e¤ects
for savers, borrowers, and the nancial intermediary, respectively, is as follows:
Ws;t  Et
1X
m=0
ms

logCs;t+m + j logHs;t+m   (Ns;t+m)



; (30)
22We used the software Dynare to obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-
order approximation to the constraints, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). See Monacelli (2006) for an example of the
Ramsey approach in a model with heterogeneous consumers.
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Wb;t  Et
1X
m=0
mb

logCb;t+m + j logHb;t+m   (Nb;t+m)



; (31)
Wf;t  Et
1X
m=0
mf [logCf;t+m] : (32)
2.9 Parameter Values
The discount factor for savers, s, is set to 0.99 so that the annual interest rate is 4% in steady state.23
The discount factor for the borrowers is set to 0.98.24 We set the discount factors for the bankers at
0.965 which, for a bank leverage parameter of 10% implies a spread of about 1 percent (on an annualized
basis) between lending and deposit rates.25 The steady-state weight of housing in the utility function,
j, is set to 0.1 in order for the ratio of housing wealth to GDP to be approximately 1.40 in the steady
state, consistent with the US data.26 We set  = 2, implying a value of the labor supply elasticity of
1.27 For the parameters controlling leverage, we set k, in line with the US data.28  is the parameter
governing the CRR, which will set according to the Basel regulation that we are considering (CRR of
8% for Basel I,II and 10.5% for Basel III). The labor income share for savers is set to 0.64, following the
estimate in Iacoviello (2005).
We assume that technology, At, follows an autoregressive process with 0:9 persistence and a normally
distributed shock.29 Table 1 presents a summary of the parameter values used:
23Since the seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott (1982), the literature on DSGE models considers a calibrated value
of the discount factor of 0.99, to pick up the value of the interest rate in the steady state. It is considered that a reasonable
value is 1% in a quarterly model (4% annualized).
24Lawrance (1991) estimated discount factors for poor consumers at between 0.95 and 0.98 at quarterly frequency. We
take the most conservative value.
25For discount factors, it is only needed for the solution of the model that both borrowers and banks are more impatient
than savers. Lowering discount factors for any agent would make them more impatient and therefore their marginal
propensity to consume would increase. Sensitivity of their consumption with respect to shocks would be higher. However,
changes in the discount factors within a realistic range represent negigible di¤erence.
26 Increasing the weight of housing in the utility function would in turn make this variable more sensitive to shocks.
However, it is realistically calibrated in line with Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Unless it is unrealistically
increased, di¤erences are negligible.
27Lowering  and make it approach to 1, would make the utility function become linear in leisure, which is arguable.
The value we have used make it closer to realistic values widely used in macro models with collateral constraints, closer to
the value estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2010). In fact, microeconomic estimates usually suggest values in the range of
0 and 0.5 (for males). Domeij and Flodén (2006) show that in the presence of borrowing constraints this estimates could
have a downward bias of 50%.
28See Iacoviello (2015).
29The persistence of the shocks is consistent with the estimates in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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Table 1: Parameter Values
s :99 Discount Factor for Savers
b :98 Discount Factor for Borrowers
f :965 Discount Factor for Banks
j :1 Weight of Housing in Utility Function
 2 Parameter associated with labor elasticity
k :90 Loan-to-value ratio
 :64 Labor income share for Savers
A :9 Technology persistence
BI,II CRR .08 CRR for Basel I, II
BIII CRR .105 CRR for Basel III
BIII CRRSS .105 Steady State CRR for Basel IIICB
3 Second-order e¤ects and the CRR, for given Monetary Policy
In this section, we analyze second order e¤ects for di¤erent capital requirement ratios, including the
ones stated in Basel I, II, and III. Throughout the section, we keep monetary policy xed. Even though
the paper takes a positive approach, this evaluation permits us understand how macroeconomic and
nancial stability operate through the di¤erent channels in the model.
Figure 1 presents the second-order approximation of each agents utility function for di¤erent values
of the CRR, given monetary policy.30 This gure displays how each agent of the economy separately is
a¤ected, and also the household aggregate.31 The blue circle represents the values corresponding to the
Basel I and II CRR, whereas the red triangle corresponds to the Basel III CRR. Notice that results are
presented in utils.
In this model, the second-order e¤ects of the three agents are driven by di¤erent forces. This creates
conicts and trade-o¤s between them. Savers, who own the rms, care about the sticky-price distortion,
therefore, ination a¤ects them negatively. Furthermore, ination makes their savings less valuable.
Borrowers are collateral constrained in the amount they can borrow. Since their collateral constraint
is binding, they always borrow the maximum amount they can, making it di¢ cult for them to smooth
30We consider a benchmark case in which the coe¢ cient for interest-rate smoothing is 0.8, which represents an empirically
plausible value, and the reaction parameters for ination and output are 0.5, as in the original paper by Taylor.
31Following Mendicino and Pescatori (2007), Rubio (2011), and Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013), we aggregate taking into
consideration the discount factor of each individual.
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Figure 1: Second-order e¤ects for di¤erent CRR for borrowers, savers, banks and households (given
baseline monetary policy).
consumption. Therefore, even though higher capital requirements produce a negative level e¤ect in
their borrowing, situations that reduce the collateral distortion and help them smooth consumption are
benecial for them. More nancially stable scenarios would do it, creating a second order positive e¤ect.
Moreover, ination is benecial for them, since their debt repayments are lower in real terms. In turn,
banks are constrained in the amount they can lend since they are required to hold a certain amount
of capital by regulation. This capital requirement distorts its intertemporal consumption decision (see
equation 16). Therefore, easing their constraint reduces this distortion for banks.
The top two panels of Figure 1 show the trade-o¤ that appears between borrowers and savers. A
higher CRR implies a more stable nancial system, since banks are constrained in the amount they can
lend. Borrowers do not follow an Euler equation for consumption, like savers do; they are not able to
follow a smooth path of consumption. Their consumption is, however, determined by the amount they
can borrow, which in turn depends on the amount banks can lend. Therefore, even though as a level
e¤ect they can borrow less, increasing the capital requirement ratio has a positive second-order e¤ect
for borrowers. This happens at the expense of savers, who are not nancially constrained.
Furthermore, higher CRR makes monetary policy less e¤ective to stabilize ination, since the money
multiplier (nancial accelerator in this case) is weaker. This means that the higher the CRR the less
stabilizing monetary policy and the higher ination volatility is. Savers su¤er from the sticky-price
distortion and their savings are worth less. Borrowers see their debt repayments decreasing in real
20
terms.
Nevertheless, in the model, we have a third agent, the nancial intermediary. The left bottom panel
shows how banks have negative second-order e¤ects with the increase in the CRR, because this tightens
their constraint and a¤ects negatively their intertemporal consumption decisions.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy for di¤erent CRR
The above section was assuming that monetary policy was taken as given, that is, that a di¤erent CRR
did not a¤ect the behavior of the central bank. However, this does not need to be the case. It seems
plausible that the optimal conduct of monetary policy changes when the CRR increases. Then, in this
subsection, we analyze how the optimized parameters of the Taylor rule for monetary policy change
for di¤erent values of the CRR. We dene the optimized reaction parameters as those that minimize
second-order losses for households.32 The table shows the specic values corresponding to Basel I, II
and Basel III, so that we can compare between these two regimes.33
Table 2 displays optimal monetary policy under di¤erent values of the CRR. We have presented CRR
values for Basel I,II and Basel III, on bold, and six other CRR, just for informational purposes. Results
show that now monetary policy can optimally react and stabilize ination. As we pointed out, when
the CRR increases, the money multiplier (or in turn the nancial accelerator) is smaller. Therefore,
in order to obtain the same impact on macroeconomic volatilities, monetary policy needs to be more
aggressive. We nd that especially for the ination reaction parameter, this is the case. If we look at
the macroeconomic and nancial volatilities (4th, 5th and 6th columns of the table), we observe that the
macroeconomic volatility is very similar for the di¤erent values of the CRR but the nancial volatility
decreases, meaning that a higher CRR enhances nancial stability and can thus be interpreted as a
macroprudential policy.34
32Beck et al. (2014) estimate that, on average, the nancial industry accounts for about 5% of a countrys GDP, based
on a sample of 77 countries for the period 1980-2007. Several other authors have recently used similar measures of value
added of the nancial sector, including Philippon (2008), Philippon and Reshef (2012), and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012).
Therefore, for simplicity, we consider that the regulator only considers household welfare.
33We have not reported results for more extreme values of the CRR because the model does not converge for CRR higher
than 39%.
34The measure that we take as a proxy for nancial stability is the variability of credit. The collateral constraint is
introducing a distortion in the economy that motivates the presence of macroprudential policies. Macroprudential policies
make the variability of credit decrease and therefore help palliate the second-order perverse e¤ects of the collateral constraint,
by creating a more stable nancial system. The measure chosen is in line with the discussion provided by Angelini et al.
(2014).
21
Table 2: Optimal Monetary Policy and Variabilities under di¤erent CRR
CRR 1 + R Ry 2 2y 2b
1% 10.7 3.1 0.14 1.97 2.70
2% 11 3.6 0.16 1.95 2.43
5% 10.9 3.6 0.16 1.95 2.26
8% (BI, II) 17.6 5.8 0.16 1.95 2.00
10% 20.7 6.6 0.16 1.96 1.91
10.5% (BIII) 20.7 6.6 0.16 1.96 1.89
15% 20.5 6.6 0.16 1.96 1.74
20% 20.7 6.6 0.16 1.96 1.61
5 Optimal Implementation of the Countercyclical Bu¤er
So far, we have only considered the compulsory capital requirements of Basel I, II and III. However,
Basel III has a dynamic macroprudential component, a countercyclical capital bu¤er that should also be
taken into account. In this section, we make this countercyclical capital bu¤er interact with monetary
policy and we analyze the optimal implementation of both policies together.
5.1 Optimal Policy Parameters
Table 3 presents results on the optimal implementation of Basel IIICB when it is interacting with mon-
etary policy. We nd the optimized values of both rules, monetary policy and Basel IIICB.35 Notice
that, in this section, we present consumption equivalent units derived from the second-order evaluation
of the model to see the e¤ect of moving to the Basel III regulation.
Considering consumption equivalent changes, we infer that the transition from Basel I, II to Basel
III, without its dynamic macroprudential component is Pareto improving for households. This is due to
the fact that optimal policies aid to reach a more stable nancial system, as the variability of borrowing
is lower, which helps borrowers to smooth consumption, and a lower ination volatility, which benets
savers. However, for banks, a higher CRR reduces their leverage and their capacity to make dividends.
Interestingly, we observe that monetary policy increases its aggressiveness when moving to Basel III
35We have considered both the cases in which monetary policy and the authority taking care of implementing Basel
IIICB , act both in a coordinated and in a non-coordinated way. We have found that results do not di¤er for both cases.
Therefore, we have reported them as a single case.
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and Basel IIICB. This higher aggressiveness results in enhanced macroeconomic stability. We also see
that introducing the countercyclical capital bu¤er increases nancial stability even more and it also helps
to reduce ination volatility.36
Table 3: Optimal Monetary Policy and CB, Consumption Equivalent Changes and Variabilities
Basel I, II Basel III Basel IIICB
b - - 2.4
1 + R 17.6 20.7 49
Ry 5.8 6.6 7.4
Consumption Equivalents (CE) - 0.045 0.057
Borrowers CE - 0.012 2.385
Savers CE - 0.033 0.077
Banks CE - -0.669 -0.999
2 0.16 0.16 0.08
2y 1.95 1.96 2.1
2b 2.00 1.89 0.82
Then, looking at consumption equivalent changes, implementing Basel IIICB is only Pareto improving
for households. Banks su¤er from a negative consumption equivalent change, though. However, if the
consumption equivalent change of winning agents, i.e. households, were large enough, there could be
room for Pareto-superior outcomes.
In order to do that, we apply the concept of KaldorHicks e¢ ciency, also known as KaldorHicks
criterion.37 Under this criterion, an outcome is considered to be more e¢ cient if a Pareto-superior
outcome can be reached by arranging su¢ cient compensation from those that are made better-o¤ to those
that are made worse-o¤ so that all would end up no worse-o¤ than before. The KaldorHicks criterion
does not require the compensation actually being paid, merely that the possibility for compensation
exists, and thus need not leave each at least as well o¤.
36We have performed a robustness check excercise including the credit to GDP with respect to their steady states in the
countercyclical bu¤er rule. With this new specication, we have obtained very similar values, namely 2.3 for b , 45 for
1 + R and 7.8 for 
R
y .
37See Scitovsky (1941).
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a positive monetary shock. BI, II versus BIII and BIIICB. Optimized
monetary and CB parameters.
We see that in Table 3, this is the case. Introducing the Basel IIICB does not provide a positive
consumption equivalent change for banks. Albeit, we can nd a system of transfers in which borrowers
and savers would compensate the banks with at least the amount they are losing, so that they are at
least indi¤erent between having the new regulation or not.
5.2 Impulse Responses
Impulse responses help illustrate the dynamic of the results. Figure 2 presents impulse responses for an
expansionary monetary policy shock for the optimized values found in Table 3. Impulses responses show
the three cases analyzed: Basel I, II, Basel III and Basel IIICB:
What we observe in the gure is that, even if the shock is expansionary, the strong ination coe¢ cients
in the Taylor rule, make the nominal policy rate actually increase so that ination is contained. However,
the real interest rate is still negative and output is increasing. As far as the real interest rate is negative,
the expansion makes borrowing increase. Nevertheless, it increases by more in the case of Basel I, II
because the capital requirement ratio is not as high as under Basel III and Basel IIICB. Then, increasing
the capital requirement ratio reduces borrowing. In terms of the response of house prices, we see that
they decrease, following the increase in the nominal interest rate. House prices are an asset price and they
move inversely with the nominal interest rate. However, borrowing still increases due to the decrease in
real rates. The behavior of house prices is mainly coming from the strong response of monetary policy
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a negative shock to bank capital. BI, II versus BIII and BIIICB. Opti-
mized monetary and CB parameters.
to ination.
When we allow for the countercyclical bu¤er to operate, borrowing increases only slightly. The
regulator, that observes that borrowing is increasing with respect to its steady state uses its instrument
to avoid this situation. Then, the capital requirement ratio increases above its steady state and helps
containing credit.
Therefore, we can conclude from the graph that increasing the static capital requirement ratio,
that is, going from an 8% in Basel I, II to a 10.5% in Basel III, dampens the e¤ects of expansionary
monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, introducing the countercyclical capital bu¤er mitigates them even
more. The channel comes mainly through borrowing; higher capital requirements reduce the capacity of
consumers to borrow.
In order to gain some more insight about the dynamics of the model, we also present Figure 3. In
this gure, we consider a shock to bank capital, which could serve as a proxy to a nancial shock. Thus,
we modify equation 11 to include this shock as follows:
Capt = bt   dt   "Ct; (33)
where "Ct follows an an autoregressive process with 0:9 persistence and a normally distributed shock.38
38We follow Iacoviello (2015) for the specication of the shock.
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Figure 3 shows how a variation in the tightness of the bankers borrowing constraint can a¤ect
equilibrium dynamics. This negative shock causes a reduction in bank capital and then, given the
constraint imposed by Basel regulations, the bank needs to adjust its balance sheet to still meet the
requirements. Since borrowing has exogenously fallen, the bank can reduce its deposits or raise new
capital reducing its dividends. However, given that the bank is relatively more impatient, this last
option is impractical and, in fact, it increases its consumption. This increase is larger in the case of
a less tight regulation, as in Basel I and II. As a consequence, both lending and deposits are reduced.
Again, the reduction is larger for Basel I and II and this is why saversconsumption increases by more in
this case. The increase in consumption by banks and savers produces a positive demand e¤ect that boosts
output and ination. The increase in ination, in turn, makes the interest rate increase, depressing house
prices. The combination of the increase in the interest rate and the fall in house prices makes borrowing
decrease further.
However, when the countercyclical capital bu¤er is in place, the capital requirement ratio reacts to
compensate the exogenous fall in capital. In the presence of this negative nancial shock, the regulation
becomes temporarily looser and the capital requirement ratio decreases. This clearly mitigates the
negative e¤ects of the shock on the nancial sector.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we use a DSGE model with housing to compute the e¤ects of Basel I, II, and III regulations
and its interactions with monetary policy. The model features three types of agents: savers, borrowers
and banks. The two latter are nancially constrained. Banks are constrained by Basel minimum re-
quirements ratios because they are forced to hold a certain amount of capital in order to extend loans.
Borrowers are constrained because they need collateral to obtain credit. In our model, there are two
policy authorities: the central bank, in charge of monetary policy, and the macroprudential authority,
taking care of macroprudential policies. The objective of the rst one is to achieve macroeconomic sta-
bility (ination and output), through the interest rate. The goal of the second one is to attain nancial
stability, using the capital requirement ratio of Basel regulations.
Within this framework, we calculate the second-order e¤ects for each agent of increasing the capital
requirement, for a given monetary policy. This analysis shows that the e¤ects of Basel regulations are
not evenly distributed. We nd that while borrowers have positive second-order e¤ects from this measure
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because it increases nancial stability, they are negative for savers and banks.
Then, we analyze the interaction of the higher capital requirements in Basel I, II, and III regulations
with monetary policy. We show that the optimal monetary policy becomes more aggressive the higher
the capital requirement is, in order to compensate for a lower money multiplier. We nd that a higher
capital requirement increases nancial stability without compromising macroeconomic stability.
Finally, we study the countercyclical capital bu¤er proposed by Basel III, interacting with monetary
policy. We approximate this regulation by a rule in which the capital requirement responds to deviations
of credit from its steady state. We show that the transition from Basel I, II to Basel III, without its
dynamic macroprudential component increases nancial stability. Adding the capital bu¤er improves
the nancial stability by more and it helps to reduce ination volatility.
When we analyze the dynamics of the model under the optimized values, we nd that higher CRR
and the macroprudential CB dampen the e¤ects of expansionary shocks through a credit restraint. If
we consider a negative bank capital shock, the CB helps mitigate its e¤ects by reducing the CRR.
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